

Beyond a Free Lunch: Evaluating the Trade-Offs of an Out-of-School Nutrition Program on Adolescent Girls' Human Capital *

Tanmay Devi Ajinkya Keskar[†] Dibya Mishra Ritika Sethi

June 2024

Abstract

This study investigates the causal impacts of two iterations of a large-scale nutritional intervention to promote the self-development and empowerment of adolescent girls in India. We use a difference-in-differences strategy to evaluate the program's effects on education and health outcomes. Our findings from the first program iteration reveal that while it successfully reduced the prevalence of anemia among adolescent girls by 2.4%, it also had unintended adverse consequences on their educational attainment. Specifically, the intervention led to an 8% increase in school dropout rates for girls and widened the gender disparity in school enrollment by 6.4%. These negative outcomes are primarily attributed to a program component that conditioned additional nutritional supplements on being out of school. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that these effects were driven by families residing in villages without secondary schools and with low levels of maternal education. In contrast, our evaluation finds that updates made to the scheme during the second iteration do not significantly impact girls' school dropout rates.

Keywords: Gender Inequality, Girls' School Enrollment, Women's Health

JEL codes: : J13, J16, J18

*Authors: Devi: Rice University. Email: tanmay.devi@rice.edu. Keskar (†corresponding author): Binghamton University (SUNY). E-mail: akeskar@binghamton.edu. Mishra: Rice University. E-mail: dibya.mishra@rice.edu. Sethi: Rice University. E-mail: ritika.sethi@rice.edu. We thank Rossella Calvi, Somdeep Chatterjee, Isabelle Perrigne, Nishith Prakash, and the participants of ASHECON 2024, ACEGD 2023 at ISI Delhi, Development Economics Workshop 2024 at UT Austin, TEAMS Workshop 2024 at the University of Houston, and AEFPP EdDev Group 2024 for their feedback. This paper was previously circulated as Beyond a Free Lunch: Unintended Consequences of an Out-of-School Nutrition Program on Adolescent Girls' Educational Enrollment.

1 Introduction

The fifth United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) aims to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that adolescent girls, defined as individuals aged between 10 and 19 years, constitute approximately 8% of the global population. Notably, India is home to over 18% of the world’s adolescent girls, amounting to more than 100 million. Consequently, enhancing the welfare of adolescent girls in India is imperative for successfully attaining the SDG targets.

An important policy to improve children’s schooling and health outcomes is a school-feeding program, which provides meals to school-going kids *in-school*. In India, the flagship Midday Meal Scheme, an in-school feeding program, has been shown to improve children’s learning outcomes (Chakraborty and Jayaraman, 2019) and health outcomes (Singh, Park, and Dercon, 2014). School feeding initiatives can be considered redistributive efforts that offer a social security framework and aid in fostering investments in human capital (Alderman and Bundy, 2012). A cost-effective way of expanding the in-school nutrition program to include out-of-school children is replacing it with take-home ration programs, where families are provided set quantities of food supply *at home*. However, the effects of replacing in-school nutrition programs with take-home ration programs on children’s human capital outcomes remain ambiguous.

In this paper, we study the effect of a flagship government of India scheme, the Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls (henceforth, SABLA), launched in 2011, aimed at improving the welfare of adolescent girls. SABLA was launched in 205 districts across India.¹ The scheme aims to provide nutritional support and vocational training to adolescent girls aged 11-18. SABLA’s multifaceted approach caters to two distinct groups of adolescent girls: out-of-school girls aged 11-14 and girls aged 15-18, regardless of their school enrollment status. SABLA offers informational and educational components designed to empower and elevate the aspirations of girl children. Girls aged 11-14 *and* out of school were provided hot cooked meals and take-home ration. The vocational training aspect of SABLA is aimed at providing informal education to out-of-school girls. In 2017, the scheme was expanded to an additional 303 districts (henceforth, SABLA 2.0) and was extended to the entire country in 2018.

¹Districts were selected based on a weighted composite index, which included school dropout rate (50%), female literacy rate (20%), child marriage rate (20%), and female labor force participation rate (10%). These districts were then divided into terciles, and the scheme was launched to cover an approximately equal number of districts in each tercile.

We begin by examining the impact of an out-of-school feeding policy on children's schooling outcomes using a parental decision-making model based on the framework of [Todd and Wolpin \(2006\)](#). Our model demonstrates how an out-of-school feeding program increases the opportunity cost of schooling, potentially leading to higher dropout rates. Additionally, the model generates testable implications regarding the heterogeneous effects of the policy, particularly concerning demographic characteristics such as the mother's education.

We leverage exogenous exposure to the program by year of birth, district, and gender in a difference-in-differences and a triple difference-in-differences framework to identify the intent to treat (ITT) parameter of SABLA on schooling and health outcomes. We test the validity of the parallel trends identification assumption using the imputation estimator developed by [Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess \(2024\)](#) as well as the robustness of our analysis against potential violations of the parallel trends assumption using the methodology proposed by [Rambachan and Roth \(2023\)](#). We use the 2009-2016 wave Annual Status of Education Report (henceforth, ASER), which collects data on schooling outcomes of children aged 5-16 in rural India. We use the 2019-2021 wave of the National Family Health Survey (henceforth, NFHS-5) for health and marriage outcomes.

The first iteration of SABLA, launched in 2011, unintentionally increased school dropout rates among adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range by 7-8% when they were provided out-of-school meals. Additionally, it widened the gender gap in school dropout rates between girls and boys by 6%. However, these effects on school dropout did not translate to effects on learning outcomes, as we find no significant impact of the policy on mathematics and reading learning outcomes.

On the positive side, in terms of health outcomes, we find a decrease in the prevalence of anemia by 3.2%. Anemia is a condition characterized by an insufficient number of red blood cells or a reduced capacity of these cells to carry oxygen. Numerous studies have demonstrated that anemia is associated with an increased risk of mortality. Research shows that anemia can lead to a higher risk of death, particularly among older adults and individuals with chronic conditions ([Penninx, Pahor, Woodman, and Guralnik, 2006](#)). A policy that has shown a significant impact on reducing childhood iron-deficiency anemia is the provision of salt fortified with iron and iodine, called double-fortified salt. [Krämer, Kumar, and Vollmer \(2021\)](#) find that providing double-fortified salt through a school lunch program can successfully reduce anemia, and in a four-year follow-up, these effects persist ([von Grafenstein, Kumar, Kumar, and Vollmer, 2021](#)). However, consistent

distribution is crucial for the long-term efficacy of such programs. [Berry, Mehta, Mukherjee, Ruebeck, and Shastry \(2020\)](#) highlight the importance of steady distribution in their analysis of a national school-based iron supplementation program in India. Our results on anemia contribute to the literature by showing the persistent long-run effects in anemia reduction in adulthood of providing out-of-school meals.

Additionally, it is well known that schooling and marriage are joint decisions in the household optimization problem of Indian parents with an adolescent girl ([Andrew and Adams, 2022](#)). Consistent with [Chatterjee and Poddar \(2024\)](#), we find no effect of the SABLA policy on the age of marriage.²

Next, we use the 2011 Census data from the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset (SHRUG) ([Asher, Lunt, Matsuura, and Novosad, 2021](#)) to study the heterogeneity of our results concerning several demographic characteristics. Our findings reveal that the unintended increase in school dropouts was driven by families in which mothers had no formal education and was more pronounced in districts characterized by higher existing rates of female dropout and higher levels of female labor force participation. At the village level, our analysis indicates that girls residing in villages without secondary schools (schools with grades up to 10) were at a higher risk of dropping out.

Lastly, we expand our analysis to evaluate the impact of the second iteration of SABLA (henceforth, SABLA 2.0) on the schooling outcomes of adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range. We find no negative unintended effect of the policy on school dropout rates, which can be attributed to the program's emphasis on encouraging a return to education through increased home visits by community workers (*Anganwadi* workers) and enhanced community involvement.

As far as we know, our paper is one of the few that have evaluated the effects of out-of-school feeding programs on the schooling outcomes of adolescent girls. The results highlight the importance of in-school feeding programs in boosting school attendance ([Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer, 2008](#); [Afridi, 2011](#); [Vermeersch and Kremer, 2005](#)). The heterogeneous results across health and educational outcomes demonstrate the multidimensional impact of the program and underscore that well-intentioned policies can potentially have unintended consequences ([Bharadwaj, Lakdawala, and Li, 2020](#); [Calvi and Keskar, 2023](#)).

²We would like to emphasize that [Chatterjee and Poddar \(2024\)](#) is the first paper to study the impact of SABLA on women's post-marital well-being, focusing on the prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV). In [Section 2](#) and [Section 7](#), we detail the differences in our analysis.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the institutional background. Section 4 sets up the model. Section 5 and Section 6 describe the data employed in the study and present the empirical strategy, respectively. Section 7 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.

2 Literature Review

Our study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of feeding programs in improving educational outcomes. Additionally, it examines gender-focused policy interventions to enhance girls' schooling outcomes.

The first set of policies to improve girls' nutritional and educational status involves providing conditional cash transfers (CCTs) contingent upon school enrollment and remaining unmarried. [Schultz \(2004\)](#) evaluates the impact of Progresa, a well-known school subsidy program in Mexico, and finds an increase in school enrollment rates of approximately 15 percentage points for girls and six percentage points for boys. [Todd and Wolpin \(2006\)](#) demonstrate that their structural model's predicted impacts align closely with the experimental results without using the post-program data. Progresa is a clear example of how reducing the opportunity cost of schooling can significantly boost children's enrollment. Evaluating the Kanyashree Prakalpa (KP) program in West Bengal, India, [Das and Sarkhel \(2023\)](#) find positive impacts on school enrollment and learning outcomes. Still, these do not extend to increases in secondary school completion rates. In a recent paper, [Buchmann, Field, Glennerster, Nazneen, and Wang \(2023\)](#) found that a financial incentive to delay marriage, combined with a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh, reduced the prevalence of underage marriage by 19%.

A second set of policies to improve girls' educational outcomes involves providing in-kind transfers. In a seminal paper, [Muralidharan and Prakash \(2017\)](#) evaluates a program in the Indian state of Bihar aimed at reducing the gender gap in secondary school enrollment by providing bicycles to girls who continued to secondary school, thereby improving their access to education. The program increased girls' secondary school enrollment by 32% and reduced the gender gap by 40%. Bicycles enhance the schooling of adolescent girls by decreasing the time and safety costs ([Borker, 2021](#)) associated with school attendance. This paper highlights the importance of the opportunity cost of education, demonstrating that the SABLA policy inadvertently increased these

costs, leading to higher school dropout rates. Similarly, [Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia \(2008\)](#) find that the provision of uniforms in Kenya reduced school absenteeism by 44% for the average student and 62% for students who previously did not own a uniform. Lastly, [Adukia \(2017\)](#) evaluates the Indian national school latrine-construction initiative and finds that it improves school attainment for both boys and girls.

The last set of interventions that have addressed the issue of student attendance involves a reduction in teacher absenteeism ([Kremer, Chaudhury, Rogers, Muralidharan, and Hammer, 2005](#)) and improvements in parental education, as highlighted by [Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan \(2012\)](#); [Banerji, Berry, and Shotland \(2017\)](#).

A substantial body of literature has highlighted the importance of *in-school* feeding programs in improving children's schooling outcomes in developing countries.³ [Afridi \(2011\)](#) examines the transition from a monthly distribution of free food grains to a daily provision of free cooked meals for school children. She finds that this policy improved girls' attendance in grade one by more than 12 percentage points. In an important study, [Chakraborty and Jayaraman \(2019\)](#) evaluates the impact of the Indian government's flagship school feeding program, the Mid Day Meal Scheme, on children's learning outcomes. The study finds that prolonged exposure to the program improved primary school-aged children's math and reading test scores. In a related paper, [Alderman, Gilligan, and Lehrer \(2012\)](#) evaluate how food for education (FFE) programs affect schooling outcomes. Using a randomized controlled trial in North Uganda, the study compares an in-school feeding program (SFP) with a take-home rations (THR) program *conditional* on school attendance. Results indicate that the in-school meals program increased enrollment for children who reached the recommended school entry age but were not enrolled at baseline; for several schooling outcomes, the effect of SFP and THR is equivalent. Our results show that removing the school attendance conditionality in THR programs can potentially lead to unintended increases in school dropout. [Aurino, Gelli, Adamba, Osei-Akoto, and Alderman \(2023\)](#) evaluate a randomized trial of the government of Ghana's school feeding program and find that two years after the program, learning outcomes measured in terms of math literacy scores improved in the treated communities, with larger effects on girls and disadvantaged children. [Vermeersch and Kremer \(2005\)](#) evaluate the impact of subsidized school meals on school participation and educational achieve-

³There is also extensive literature from the United States examining the effects of universal free school breakfast on students' schooling outcomes ([Leos-Urbel, Schwartz, Weinstein, and Corcoran, 2013](#); [Imberman and Kugler, 2014](#); [Hinrichs, 2010](#)).

ment among preschool children in Kenya through a randomized controlled trial. The study finds that children in the treatment group had 30% higher school attendance than the control group. However, improvements in learning outcomes were only observed in schools with an experienced teacher, aligning with the broader school feeding literature, which suggests that increased enrollment does not necessarily translate to improved learning outcomes. Lastly, [He \(2009\)](#) found no effects of a school feeding program on enrollment in Sri Lanka, and [McEwan \(2013\)](#) found that higher-calorie meals targeted at relatively poor schools had no impact on enrollment in Chile.

The SABLA program, initially implemented in a few districts, has now expanded nationwide but remains relatively understudied. To the best of our knowledge, the study conducted by [Chatterjee and Poddar \(2024\)](#) is the first to evaluate the program, focusing on women's post-marital outcomes, particularly the prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV). They find that SABLA decreased the prevalence of IPV, primarily physical and sexual violence among married women. We now outline the two key differences between our study and theirs.

First, unlike [Chatterjee and Poddar \(2024\)](#), the primary focus of our paper is to evaluate the SABLA program component that provides out-of-school meals to adolescent girls aged 11-14, assessing its impact on school enrollment and learning outcomes. For this purpose, we leverage the 2009-2016 wave of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). This repeated cross-sectional dataset contains detailed information on the schooling outcomes of over 780,000 adolescents in the relevant age group. The variations in the cohort, district of residence, and gender allow us to identify the policy impact using a difference-in-differences (DiD) and a triple difference (DDD) framework.⁴ In Section 7, we discuss in detail the limitation of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data in identifying the effects of the out-of-school meal component of SABLA on education outcomes. Second, [Chatterjee and Poddar \(2024\)](#) use the fourth wave of NFHS data conducted in 2015-16, four years after the initial implementation of SABLA, to assess the program's impact on IPV. In contrast, we use the more recent fifth wave of NFHS data conducted in 2019-21, eight years after the program's implementation, to study its effects on health and marital outcomes. This allows us to have a larger sample of women treated by the policy in the 11-14 age range, which is impossible with the fourth wave of NFHS data.⁵

⁴In Section 5 we describe the data in detail.

⁵Another potential limitation of using NFHS data to study the effect of SABLA is that most married women in India reside in their husbands' natal homes. This creates the possibility of mislabeling treatment indicators if women have moved across districts post-marriage and have been surveyed post-marriage, as is the case for most women in NFHS. Empirically, about a quarter of women do not reside in the same district where they were born ([Calvi, Beauchamp, and Fulford, 2022](#)). This issue is mitigated with ASER data, which tracks children residing in their

3 Background: The SABLA Program

The Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls, also known as SABLA (meaning "empowered"), is a female adolescent empowerment program initiated in 2011 across 205 districts in India under the Ministry of Women and Child Development. It targets adolescent girls aged 11-18, particularly those out of school. Leveraging the infrastructure of the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), SABLA is a centrally-sponsored scheme implemented by state governments and union territories. The cost-sharing for the nutrition component is split equally between the states.

The SABLA program's primary objectives include improving adolescent girls' health and nutrition status by raising awareness about health, hygiene, nutrition, and reproductive and sexual health. The program also seeks to develop their home-based, life, and vocational skills. Additionally, it aims to reintegrate out-of-school adolescent girls into formal and non-formal education systems.

SABLA offers nutritional support to girls aged 11 to 18, providing 600 calories and 18-20 grams of protein through a hot cooked meal or take-home ration, and iron and folic acid supplementation from the *anganwadi* centers. For girls aged 11 to 14, this provision is *contingent* upon them being out of school. Moreover, SABLA offers comprehensive health education, checkups, counseling on family welfare, and information on reproductive and sexual health to all girls, irrespective of their school enrollment status. Girls aged 15 to 18 additionally benefit from vocational training under the National Skill Development Program.

The selection of districts for the SABLA program was conducted across all States and Union Territories using a composite weighted index based on indicators relevant to the condition of adolescent girls in the country. These indicators and their corresponding weights are: female school dropout rate (50%), female literacy rate (20%), female child marriage rate (20%), and female work participation rate (10%). Based on this comprehensive index, the chosen districts represent a diverse mix of well-performing, moderately performing, and poorly performing districts nationwide.

The SABLA scheme is supported through a centrally sponsored framework, incorporates a Matching State Share (MSS) for its nutritional aspects. Based on the 2011 policy guidelines, the

natal homes.

Government of India funds 50% of the set financial norms for these components and fully funds the non-nutritional elements. With an estimated budget of 87 crores INR (\$1.93 million) for implementation across 2300 blocks in 205 districts, the scheme allocates Rs. 3.8 lakhs per block for its Non-Nutrition Component. Financial norms are INR 5 per beneficiary per day over 300 days, including micronutrient fortification costs. With 1 million adolescent girls as beneficiaries, the government's annual contribution to nutritional expenses amounts to 865 crores INR (\$19.22 million). Additional costs for surveys, evaluations, and workshops total about 15 crores INR (\$333,333), bringing the total annual expenditure shared by the state and central government to approximately 1832 crores INR (\$40.71 million) ([Ministry of Women and Child Development , 2011](#)).

An early administrative evaluation of the SABLA program, as reported in the [Ministry of Women and Child Development \(2013\)](#), revealed two concerning findings. Firstly, efforts to reintegrate out-of-school girls into formal education were ineffective. Secondly, the take-home ration was preferred over the hot cooked meal. Over half of the out-of-school girls reported sharing the take-home ration with their families. Many parents and officials indicated that the take-home ration served as a critical incentive for parents to send their daughters to the *anganwadi* centers.

The first finding raises questions about whether the program inadvertently incentivized families to keep girls out of school, given that meal provision was contingent on the girls being out of school. The second finding suggests that the program may have been used to obtain rations for the family instead of directly benefiting the participating girls, contradicting the program's aim of improving girls' nutritional status through their personal consumption of the provided nutritional package.

3.1 SABLA 2.0

From 2017 onwards, the program underwent significant expansion and several modifications. Renamed as the Scheme for Adolescent Girls (SAG) in 2017, we henceforth refer to it as SABLA 2.0. By 2018, SABLA 2.0 had expanded to encompass every district in the country ([Ministry of Women and Child Development , 2018](#)).

In addition to its geographical expansion, SABLA 2.0 emphasized integrating out-of-school girls into formal education, addressing the challenges highlighted in evaluating the program's initial phase ([Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2013](#)). Some initiatives included enhanc-

ing home visits by *Anganwadi* workers and engaging various community members and authorities to motivate the reintegration of girls into formal education.

The restructuring of the SABLA program also involved discontinuing the Kishori Shakti Yojana (KSY) in selected districts and integrating it into the broader framework of SABLA to avoid overlap and ensure more streamlined service delivery. KSY was an initiative dedicated to improving the socio-economic conditions of adolescent girls through a focus on nutrition, health and hygiene, and life skills education.

4 Model

In this section, we use the framework of [Todd and Wolpin \(2006\)](#) and [Wolpin \(2013\)](#) to set up a parental decision-making model about child schooling to show how the SABLA policy impacts children's schooling decisions.

Consider a representative household with a single child in primary school and facing the decision to either send them to school or the labor market. The family has an exogenous income of Y . The household solves the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c,s} \quad & \log(c) + \gamma s \\ \text{subject to} \quad & c \leq Y + s(R - k) + (1 - s)\tau, \end{aligned}$$

where $U(c, s) = \log(c) + \gamma s$ is the household utility function, c is the individual's consumption, γ is a parameter representing additional utility from schooling, and s is a binary decision variable that denotes whether the household sends their child to school ($s = 1$) or to the labor market ($s = 0$). Households are heterogeneous in γ . In particular, $\gamma = \gamma(X_h, X_c, X_v; I)$, where X_h, X_c and X_v & I denote the vector of household-level, child-level, and village-level characteristics, and parent's information set that affect parent's utility from their child's schooling.⁶ The household budget constraint is $c \leq Y + s(R - k) + (1 - s)\tau$, where k is the total cost of schooling, τ is the opportunity cost of schooling; this can take the form wages that the child earns through child labor in the labor market if they do not go to school or their contribution in home production and R , represents returns to schooling in the labor market. We now solve for the household's optimal decision.

⁶ γ can be positive or negative; therefore, γ can be interpreted as the utility or disutility of schooling.

Solution and Model Predictions

The household aims to maximize $\log(c) + \gamma s$ subject to $c \leq Y + s(R - k) + (1 - s)\tau$. Since consumption is continuous, we can replace $c \leq Y + s(R - k) + (1 - s)\tau$ with $c = Y + s(R - k) + (1 - s)\tau$. Substituting for c in the maximand, the household decides to send their child to school if $\log(Y + \tau) \leq \log(Y + R - k) + \gamma$. This allows us to define a threshold cost K^* such that if the cost of schooling k is less than K^* , the household will send their child to school. The threshold cost K^* is given by:

$$K^* = Y + R - e^{-\gamma} \cdot (Y + \tau) \quad (1)$$

Consider an environment where children receive meals *in-school*, as in India, where children in the age group of six to fourteen years studying in grades one to eight enroll and attend the school are provided meals according to specified nutritional standards (Chakraborty and Jayaraman, 2019).

In this environment, consider the effect of the SABLA policy, which provided meals to out-of-school adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range and vocational training to girls in the 15-18 age range. The scheme can be thought of as *reducing the opportunity cost of not attending school* as girls are no longer required to attend school to receive the meals. The model captures this by an increase in τ . Taking the partial derivative of K^* with respect to τ we get:


$$\frac{\partial K^*}{\partial \tau} = -e^{-\gamma} \leq 0 \quad (2)$$

. Therefore, increasing the opportunity cost of schooling will reduce the threshold cost and lower the likelihood that the household will send their child to school. Figure 1 shows a simple graphical illustration of the model. An increase in the threshold cost of schooling from K^* to K_{new}^* increases the proportion of students dropping out by the shaded area in red.

The model presented in the previous section can be utilized to examine the heterogeneous impact of the SABLA policy based on demographic characteristics. Recall that $\gamma \equiv \gamma(X_h, X_c, X_v; I)$, meaning that the relative utility of schooling, γ , varies between households depending on demographic factors. We will now demonstrate how the SABLA policy can have varying effects across different households.

First, consider the mother's education, X_m , as one of the components of the household charac-

Figure 1: Effect of SABLA policy



Note: The figure illustrates the effect of the SABLA policy on school dropout rates. Due to an increase in the opportunity cost of schooling (τ), the threshold cost K^* , below which parents decide to send their children to school, decreases. Consequently, the school dropout rate increases, as indicated by the area in green.

teristics vector X_h . Under the assumption $\frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial X_m} \geq 0$ (Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney, 2014), from equation 2, we can show that the decrease in the opportunity cost of schooling is smaller in households with more educated mothers. Consequently, the threshold cost K^* is lower, leading to a smaller likelihood of school dropout.

Second, consider the presence of a government secondary school up to grade 10, X_s , as one of the components of the village characteristics vector X_v . Under the assumption $\frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial X_v} \geq 0$, from equation 2, we can show that the decrease in the opportunity cost of schooling is smaller for households that live in a village with a secondary school. Therefore, the threshold cost K^* is lower, leading to a smaller probability of school dropout for these families.

5 Data and Measurement

Table 1: Summary Statistics

| | Observations | Mean | St.Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
|--|--------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| Dropped Out | 780794 | 0.067 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| High Reading Level | 668512 | 0.804 | 0.397 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| High Math Level | 666886 | 0.599 | 0.490 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Girl Child | 773841 | 0.470 | 0.499 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Child Age | 780794 | 14.906 | 0.810 | 14.000 | 16.000 |
| Child Dropout Age | 67147 | 13.341 | 1.388 | 11.000 | 16.000 |
| Mother's Education | 756723 | 0.472 | 0.499 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Father's Education | 725720 | 0.713 | 0.452 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Mother's Age | 752343 | 37.815 | 6.833 | 17.000 | 80.000 |
| Father's Age | 727305 | 43.215 | 7.318 | 17.000 | 85.000 |
| Wealth Index | 780794 | 0.618 | 0.320 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Government Secondary School in Village | 735217 | 0.242 | 0.428 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Observations | 780794 | | | | |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Child dropout age is conditional on the child dropping out of school. Mother's (Father's) education is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the mother(father) went to school. The wealth index is constructed using principal component analysis of the following household-level variables: house material type, a dummy variable for television, phone, and electricity. A high reading level is defined as the child being able to read a paragraph or story. A high math level is defined as the child being able to perform subtraction or division.

The analysis utilizes two data sources: the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) to assess educational outcomes and the 2019-21 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) to examine health outcomes.

The ASER survey is a nationally representative examination designed to evaluate the schooling outcomes of rural Indian children with a focus on fundamental literacy and numeracy outcomes. ASER differs from most large-scale assessments as it is conducted in households, not schools. This approach allows it to include all children—those not enrolled in any school, dropouts, students from various educational institutions, including government, private, and religious schools, and those absent on assessment day. The ASER primary survey utilizes a two-stage sampling methodology to represent rural households accurately in its dataset. In the first stage, 30 villages from each rural district are randomly chosen through a probability proportional to size method, deliberately excluding urban districts. To ensure temporal variability and updated representation, ASER maintains a rotating panel where 10 villages are cycled out of the survey annually.

In each selected village, the survey employs the "right-hand rule," a pseudo-random selection technique that simplifies the process by circumventing the need for an exhaustive household listing. This method facilitates the selection of 20 households from each village. The ASER teams then

administer assessments in reading and mathematics to all children aged 5 to 16 found within these households, regardless of whether they are enrolled in school or their specific age or grade. Additionally, comprehensive data on the schooling status of all children aged 3 to 16 in these households are collected to provide further educational context.

We analyze seven waves of ASER data from the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016. Our selection criteria include children aged 14 years and older who have completed primary education, defined as remaining in school until at least age 11.⁷ This criterion aligns with the target demographic of the SABLA scheme, which focuses on adolescent girls aged between 11-14 and 15-18 years. Given our primary research interest in examining the school dropout rates among girls exposed to the SABLA program during the 11-14 age window, we specifically select children 14 years and older. This allows us to capture outcomes for girls who have experienced the full impact of the SABLA intervention. Furthermore, considering that ASER assesses children up to the age of 16, our sample comprises individuals within the 14-16 age bracket. To our knowledge, ASER represents the only nationally representative dataset that captures dropout rates specifically for students aged 11-14. This unique aspect of ASER makes it particularly effective for investigating the impact of the SABLA scheme on school dropout rates within this age range, especially when the out-of-school meal component was included in the program.⁸ In 2017, the SABLA scheme expanded to more districts and was available nationwide by 2018. For our secondary analysis, we examine the impact of this expansion on schooling outcomes by incorporating data from the 2018 and 2022 ASER waves into our study.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our sample, comprising approximately 780,000 students aged 14-16 who have completed primary education. The average dropout rate within this group is 6.7%. Among those who dropped out, the median age at dropout is 13 years, typically around the eighth grade. Regarding literacy and numeracy skills, 80% of the children can read a paragraph or a story, and 60% can perform basic mathematical operations such as subtraction or division. Regarding parental education, 47% of the children have mothers, and 71% have fathers who attended school. Lastly, 24.2% of children live in villages with a government-run secondary

⁷A robustness check detailed in Section 6 confirms that the SABLA scheme does not influence primary school dropout rates.

⁸The NFHS-5, conducted between 2019 and 2021, records years of schooling for women aged 15 and older. However, a significant limitation arises when using this measure as an outcome: it aggregates the effects of SABLA exposure during both the 11-14 and 15-18 age windows. Consequently, children exposed to SABLA and continued their education past the age of 14 constitute a selectively retained group. Thus, the years of education variable in NFHS-5 does not effectively isolate the impact of SABLA during the critical 11-14 age window on school dropouts.

school that provides education beyond the eighth grade.

To examine the impact of the SABLA program’s initial implementation in 2011 and its expansion in 2017 on women’s health, particularly anemia and marital outcomes, we use data from the fifth wave of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), conducted between 2019 and 2021.

6 Empirical Strategy

Our empirical analysis focuses on studying the effect of the SABLA policy, introduced in 2011, on the schooling outcomes of adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range. We exploit variation across districts and birth years to identify the impact of SABLA on educational attainment, utilizing a difference-in-differences framework to assess the policy’s effects. The baseline specification is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Post}_i \times \text{SABLA-District}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_i + \beta_3 \text{SABLA-District}_i + \alpha_c + \alpha_d + \epsilon_i, \quad (3)$$

Here, y_i denotes the educational outcome of interest for girl i . The variable Post_i is an indicator that equals one if she was 14 or younger in 2011, aligning with the age group targeted by the SABLA program’s out-of-school meal component. The SABLA-District_i variable indicates individuals born in districts where SABLA was implemented in 2011. α_c and α_d represent fixed effects for cohort (year of birth) and district, respectively, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across time and location that could influence schooling outcomes independently of SABLA.

In alternative specifications, we include a vector (X_i) of exogenous controls at the household and village level. These controls include indicators of parental education (whether each parent attended school), parents’ ages, and a household wealth index, constructed using the first principal component of a principal component analysis, incorporating variables related to household construction materials and amenities. Additionally, the vector includes village infrastructure variables, specifically indicator variables denoting the presence of a secondary school within the village and the existence of a tarred metal road.

β_1 is the parameter of interest and captures the average treatment effect on the treated exposure to the first iteration of the SABLA policy initiated in 2011 on adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range.

We further analyze the impact of the SABLA policy on the 11-14 age range using a triple difference-in-differences framework, incorporating gender variation as the scheme was exclusively targeted at girls and unavailable to boys. The specification is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_i = & \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Post}_i \times \text{SABLA-District}_i \times \text{Girl}_i + \gamma_2 \text{Post}_i \times \text{Girl}_i + \\
 & \gamma_3 \text{SABLA-District}_i \times \text{Girl}_i + \gamma_4 \text{Post}_i \times \text{SABLA-District}_i + \gamma_5 \text{Girl}_i + \\
 & \gamma_6 \text{SABLA-District}_i + \gamma_7 \text{Post}_i + \alpha_c + \alpha_d + \epsilon_i,
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4}$$

Here, γ_1 is the parameter of interest and captures the average treatment effect on the treated exposure to the first iteration of the SABLA policy initiated in 2011 on adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range compared to adolescent boys.

Parallel Trends, Robustness Checks, and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity The validity of our results relies on the parallel trends assumption. This assumption requires that, in the absence of the SABLA policy introduced in 2011, the evolution of school dropout rates for adolescent girls in SABLA and non-SABLA districts would have followed the same trajectory. We implement multiple analyses to substantiate our identification assumption.

First, we show that the SABLA policy targeted adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range did not affect adolescent boys. We estimate equation (3) for the sub-sample of boys and fail to reject the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 = 0$.

Second, we perform a falsification test (Duflo, 2001) as shown in Appendix Table A1. In this test, we replace the variable Post_i with a variable equal to one if the individual was born between 1995 and 1996 and zero if they were born between 1993 and 1994. If there were differences in trends between the gender gap in school dropout rates between boys and girls in SABLA and non-SABLA districts, we would find a statistically significant coefficient on the newly defined interaction term. However, we do not find this for our outcome of interest.

Third, since the SABLA scheme targeted adolescent girls aged eleven years and above, it should not affect the primary school completion rate (grade 5 completion rate). In Appendix Table A2, we show that the SABLA policy did not affect adolescent girls' primary school completion relative to boys, using a triple difference-in-differences framework as in Equation 4.

Recent literature on difference-in-differences suggests that estimates from equation (3) may be biased if treatment effects vary across groups or periods (Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Callaway and

Sant'Anna, 2021). To evaluate the robustness of our estimates in light of this concern, we apply the imputation estimator developed by Borusyak et al. (2024), which accounts for heterogeneity in treatment effects. Appendix Figure A2, panels (A) and (C) display the event study results of the SABLA policy's impact on girls and boys, respectively. Conveniently, this method facilitates testing the identifying assumptions of parallel trends and the absence of anticipation effects using only observations from untreated groups. We fail to reject the null hypothesis using an F-test that jointly tests whether the lead coefficients differ from zero, commonly interpreted as pre-trends for both girls (p-value = 0.17) and boys (p-value = 0.32).

Lastly, we test the robustness of our analysis against potential violations of the parallel trends assumption using the methodology proposed by Rambachan and Roth (2023) in Appendix Figure A2, panels (B) and (D). The panels present the original Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) confidence intervals averaged over all post-treatment periods (depicted in red) alongside the robust confidence sets (in black), calculated using the methodology by Rambachan and Roth (2023). This approach accounts for possible differences in long-term secular trends between adolescents in districts with and without the SABLA policy. Specifically, we allow for variation in linear trends between these groups and assess how significant departures from linearity would need to be to invalidate our findings. We explore the sensitivity of our results concerning the 2011 SABLA policy's impact on school dropout rates by limiting how much the trend differences between the two district types can vary between consecutive periods. We construct credible confidence intervals for the average treatment effect on the treated, ensuring these are uniformly valid under our specified constraints. The robustness of these results is evaluated across a spectrum of values for M , where $M = 0$ indicates a scenario allowing for a linear trend in the outcome variable to differ between individuals in districts with and without SABLA. In contrast, higher values of M permit deviations from linearity in trends between consecutive periods. The analysis reveals that the statistically significant effect observed for girls is robust to linear, but not to non-linear, violations of the parallel trends assumption. Conversely, the estimates are not robust to linear or non-linear deviations from the assumption of parallel trends for boys.

7 Results

Table 2: Dropout Rates: Girls

| | (1) Dropped Out | (2) Dropped Out | (3) Dropped Out | (4) Dropped Out | (5) Dropped Out |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| SABLA District × Treated Cohort | 0.005*** (0.002) | 0.004** (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) | | |
| SABLA District × Fully Treated Cohort | | | | 0.005* (0.003) | |
| SABLA District × Partially Treated Cohort | | | | 0.006** (0.002) | |
| τ | | | | | 0.006*** (0.002) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Imputation Estimator (Borusyak et al. (2023)) | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 364,030 | 324,585 | 304,621 | 364,030 | 364,030 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.071 | 0.070 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. τ estimate is obtained from the imputation estimator in [Borusyak et al. \(2024\)](#). In column (4), the fully treated cohort includes children aged less than or equal to 11 in 2011, and the partially treated cohort includes children aged 12-14 in 2011. In columns (1) - (3), the treated cohort is defined as the cohort of children either fully or partially treated by SABLA.

We now present our empirical findings regarding the impact of the SABLA policy on children's human capital outcomes. First, we explore the policy's effects on educational metrics, specifically examining school dropout rates and learning outcomes. We explain our results in the context of the simple model outlined in Section 4. Second, we document important heterogeneities in the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect across various household and village characteristics. Finally, we assess the policy's influence on health metrics, focusing on the prevalence of anemia.

Dropout Rates: Table 2 shows the estimated Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect of SABLA for girls exposed to the policy in the 11-14 age range using the specification in equation (3); as previously mentioned, this is the age range when the policy provided out-of-school meals to the adolescent girls in the treated districts. From Table 2, column (1), the school dropout rates increased by 0.005 percentage points (p-value < 0.001), which corresponds to a 7% increase in the school dropout rate among adolescent girls affected by the SABLA policy in 2011 in the 11-14 age range. These results remain practically unchanged after controlling for household-level demographic variables (Table 2, column (2)) and controlling for village-level variables (Table 2, column (3)). In Table 2, column (4), we categorize the treated cohort into two groups. The first group, the fully treated cohort, comprises adolescent girls who were 11 years old or younger when SABLA was introduced in 2011. These individuals were exposed to the program throughout the entire 11-14 age range.

The second group, the partially treated cohort, includes girls older than 11 but younger than 14 at the policy’s inception. For both cohorts, the policy impact resulted in an $\approx 7\%$ increase in school dropout rates.⁹ Additionally, column (5) of Table 2 presents the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) estimate computed using the imputation estimator developed by [Borusyak et al. \(2024\)](#), denoted by τ as per their terminology. According to this approach, the dropout rates for girls in the 11-14 age range increased by 0.006 percentage points (p-value < 0.001), translating to an 8% rise in the school dropout rate.

Table 3: Dropout Rates: Boys

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out |
| SABLA District \times Treated Cohort | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.002) | | |
| SABLA District \times Fully Treated Cohort | | | | 0.001 (0.003) | |
| SABLA District \times Partially Treated Cohort | | | | 0.002 (0.002) | |
| τ | | | | | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Imputation Estimator (Borusyak et al. (2023)) | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 409,811 | 366,939 | 343,872 | 409,811 | 409,811 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.063 | 0.062 | 0.062 | 0.063 | 0.063 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother’s age, the father’s age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family’s wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent’s house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child’s birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. τ estimate is obtained from the imputation estimator in [Borusyak et al. \(2024\)](#). In column (4), the fully treated cohort includes children aged less than or equal to 11 in 2011, and the partially treated cohort includes children aged 12-14 in 2011. In columns (1) - (3), the treated cohort is defined as the cohort of children either fully or partially treated by SABLA.

Table 3 presents the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) estimates for boys within the 11-14 age range, employing the model outlined in equation (3). Given that the SABLA policy was exclusively targeted toward adolescent girls, the inclusion of boys serves as a placebo test, akin to the methodology used in [Duflo \(2001\)](#).¹⁰ The results across various specifications, detailed in columns (1)-(4), consistently show no effect of the SABLA policy on boys. This outcome is further corroborated by employing the imputation estimator developed by [Borusyak et al. \(2024\)](#), which also indicates no impact of the policy on boys.

⁹Results for the partially treated cohort are significant at the 5% level, while those for the fully treated cohort reach significance at the 10% level. This difference is primarily attributable to the larger sample size for the partially treated cohort.

¹⁰The potential impact of the SABLA policy on boys, although not directly targeted by the program, may manifest through peer effects, as suggested in [Lavy and Schlosser \(2011\)](#).

Table 4: Dropout Rates: Girls Relative to Boys

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out |
| SABLA District \times Treated Cohort \times Girl Child | 0.004* (0.003) | 0.004* (0.003) | 0.005* (0.003) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 773,841 | 691,524 | 648,493 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.067 | 0.065 | 0.066 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Next, we examine the impact of the SABLA policy on school dropout rates through a triple difference-in-differences (DDD) framework. Figure A1 in the Appendix provides an event study for the dropout rates of girls relative to boys. The joint F-test of the pre-trends gives an F-statistic of 0.77 (p-value = 0.51); therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of pre-trends. Table 4 details the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) parameter estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, adhering to the model specified in equation (4). This analysis reveals that the initial rollout of the SABLA policy in 2011 led to an increase in the gender gap in school dropout rates between boys and girls aged 11-14. Specifically, the relative school dropout rate for girls compared to boys increased by 0.004 percentage points (p-value < 0.01), corresponding to a 6% increase in the relative dropout rate. This finding highlights a significant gender-specific impact of the policy on educational discontinuation rates.

These results demonstrate that the initial implementation of the SABLA policy led to an increase in the school dropout rate among adolescent girls aged 11-14 by 6-8%. Furthermore, it exacerbated the gender gap in school dropout rates, with girls experiencing a relative increase compared to boys. Regarding the magnitude of the effect, our results align with some of the existing results in the literature studying the impact of providing *in-school* meals on school attendance and enrollment. For instance, Jayaraman and Simroth (2015) report a 13% increase in primary school enrollment attributed to midday meals served within the school setting, an effect primarily driven by grade 1 enrollment, with a baseline enrollment rate of 84%. Alderman et al. (2012)

found that a school feeding program in Uganda, which included both a mid-morning snack and lunch, did not increase overall enrollment but did lead to a 9% increase in the share of children aged 6–13 years who started school, with an initial enrollment share of 68.6%. On the other hand, specific *in-school* feeding programs in Sri Lanka and Chile have found no effects on school enrollment (He, 2009; McEwan, 2013)

Table 5: Learning Outcomes: Reading and Math Skills

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | High Reading Level | High Reading Level | High Reading Level | High Math Level | High Math Level | High Math Level |
| SABLA District × Treated Cohort | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.006 (0.005) | -0.005 (0.005) | -0.004 (0.005) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 318,078 | 284,868 | 267,239 | 317,289 | 284,210 | 266,657 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.801 | 0.803 | 0.802 | 0.562 | 0.564 | 0.561 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A high reading level is the ability to read a paragraph or a story. A high math level is the ability to perform subtraction or division.

Learning Outcomes: Next, we assess the impact of the SABLA policy on learning outcomes, specifically focusing on language and mathematics proficiency. It's important to note that the estimated ITT parameter captures the effect on *all* children treated by the policy, and the effect on the dropped-out children is not identified. This is mainly due to peer effects (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011). For the students who dropped out, we might expect learning outcomes to decrease due to a reduction in school resources; however, for the students who choose not to drop out, the learning outcomes can improve due to a reduction in negative peer effects if low-ability children dropped out, or decrease due to a reduction in positive peer effects if high-ability children dropped out.¹¹

Table 5 indicates that although there was an increase in dropout rates, the SABLA policy did not significantly influence language or mathematics learning outcomes for adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range. The findings are consistent and robust across various specifications. Table 3 in the Appendix presents the SABLA policy's effect on adolescent boys' learning outcomes. Our analysis shows no significant effect on learning outcomes for boys overall; however, in two specifications that exclude village-level exogenous controls, we observe a minor negative impact on mathematics outcomes. This effect diminishes upon including village-level control variables. Additionally, Table A4 reveals no significant differences in learning outcomes for girls relative to

¹¹The seminal paper by Kremer and Miguel (2004) on the effects of a deworming program on schooling outcomes finds a substantial reduction in school absenteeism by improving health but no discernible impact on learning outcomes for similar reasons.

boys when employing the triple difference-in-differences approach outlined in equation (4) across various specifications.¹²

The impact of feeding programs on learning outcomes remains uncertain. Educational interventions, especially those not directly integrated with pedagogical strategies, frequently face challenges in significantly influencing learning outcomes. This is primarily because they fail to address a critical barrier to learning: the misalignment between the level of classroom instruction and the student's actual learning levels (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016; Muralidharan, Singh, and Ganimian, 2019).

Vermeersch and Kremer (2005) investigate the effects of a fully subsidized in-school breakfast program for preschool children in Western Kenya on school attendance and learning outcomes through a randomized controlled trial. Their results indicate a 30% higher school participation rate in the treatment group compared to the control group. However, improvements in learning outcomes were observed only in schools where the teacher was relatively experienced before the program's implementation. Similarly, Jomaa, McDonnell, and Probart (2011) and Gelli, Meir, and Espejo (2014) report that school feeding programs improve school attendance but show inconsistent effects on academic achievement. An important exception is the study by Chakraborty and Jayaraman (2019), which evaluated the popular Mid-day Meals program in India and found positive effects on learning outcomes. Notably, all these programs provided meals *in-school*, whereas the SABLA program is an out-of-school feeding initiative.

¹²Another potential explanation for the null results concerning the impact of the SABLA policy on learning outcomes is that the reading and mathematics assessments used in the ASER survey may not be sufficiently advanced for the age group affected by the policy, leading to ceiling effects. Evidence supporting this view is presented in Table 1, which shows that 80% of the sample already exhibits a high reading level, defined as the ability to read a paragraph or a story. However, since this metric represents the only measure of learning outcomes available in our dataset, it limits our capacity to determine whether the SABLA policy impacted more advanced competencies with the data at hand.


7.1 Heterogeneity Analysis

Figure 2: Dropout Rates Girls Relative to Boys: Heterogeneity by District Quality



Note: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report(ASER) merged with the 2011 Census data from the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset (SHRUG) (Asher et al., 2021). Districts are divided into terciles based on female dropout rates, literacy rates, and labor force participation.

Figure 3: Dropout Rates Girls Relative to Boys: Heterogeneity Results



Note: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report(ASER) merged the 2011 Census data from the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset (SHRUG) (Asher et al., 2021) with the ASER data at the district level.

The previous analysis revealed our principal finding: the initial implementation of the SABLA policy led to an increase in the school dropout rate among adolescent girls aged 11-14. We conducted a heterogeneity analysis to delve deeper into this result and ascertain how different subgroups within our study population were affected. This involved examining the school dropout rates of girls relative to boys and analyzing variations across household-level and village-level covariates. To perform the heterogeneity analysis, we merged the 2011 Census data from the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset (SHRUG) (Asher et al., 2021) with the ASER data at the district level.

Leveraging the 2011 Census data from SHRUG, we categorized districts based on baseline metrics such as female dropout rates, literacy rates, and labor force participation. To systematically assess the impact of the SABLA program, we created an index to classify districts into three performance categories. These categories are defined by terciles: the bottom tercile represents districts with poor performance, the middle tercile includes districts with medium performance, and the top tercile encompasses districts with good performance.¹³ This categorization allows us to assess the heterogeneous impact of the SABLA program by district quality. Figure 2 shows that the increase in dropout rates is primarily driven by districts in the lower terciles of the index, further exacerbating the dropout rate gap between districts.

Figure 3, panel (A), shows that the increase in dropout rates for adolescent girls relative to boys in the 11-14 age range is driven by households in which their mothers did not attend school. This result is in line with the comparative statics outlined in Section 4, which shows that under the assumption that the utility received by households from their daughter's education is increasing with the mother's education, the effect of SABLA on adolescent girls' dropout rates will be higher in households with lower levels of maternal education. On the other hand, the difference in dropout rates between households where the father attended school and those where he did not is statistically insignificant (Figure 3, panel (B)).

Figure 3, panel (C), shows that the villages driving the increase in school dropouts are those without a government secondary school (schools with grades up to 10). This highlights the importance of school infrastructure at the village level (Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017). Furthermore, this result is consistent with the model assumption in Section 4, which posits that if households in

¹³The official categorization of districts for the SABLA program is not publicly accessible; therefore, we created an index using specified weights used for selection of SABLA districts. This index includes the female school dropout rate (50%), female literacy rate (20%), and female work participation rate (10%). The female child marriage rate (20%) was not included due to the absence of available data.

villages with a secondary school receive higher utility from their daughter's education compared to those in villages without a secondary school, then the effect of the SABLA policy on the school dropout rate will be larger for households in villages lacking a secondary school.

Figure 3, panel (D), shows that the policy effect is driven by districts with previously high female school dropout rates, and Figure 3, panel (E), reveals that the dropout rates are higher in districts with high levels of female labor force participation (FLFP).

Although we do not observe FLFP by sector, women in India tend to disproportionately work in the informal sector (Bonnet, Vanek, Chen et al., 2019). This sector tends to employ women with lower education attainment. Generally, women with very low levels of education are more likely to be in the labor force. Moreover, lower FLFP in a region may indicate fewer acceptable opportunities for higher educated women (Fletcher, Pande, and Moore, 2017). Similarly, Azam (2012) and Afridi, Dinkelman, and Mahajan (2018) note that the market return to obtaining only a primary school level of education has not seen much growth for women.

These findings in the literature may help explain why dropout rates are higher in districts with high FLFP. High-FLFP districts likely offer more opportunities for securing jobs that require lower levels of formal education. Consequently, dropping out of school to take advantage of SABLA benefits might seem like a more attractive option for adolescent girls in these areas. Additionally, the vocational training component of SABLA could further add to this incentive (Fletcher, Pande, and Moore, 2017).

7.2 Expanded SABLA (SABLA 2.0)

Table 6: Dropout Rates: Expanded SABLA

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out | Dropped Out |
| SABLA District × Treated Cohort | 0.006*** (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| SABLA Expanded District × Treated Cohort | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 459,721 | 411,381 | 390,193 | 502,256 | 451,313 | 426,985 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.067 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.060 | 0.059 | 0.059 |
| Gender | Girls | Girls | Girls | Boys | Boys | Boys |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2022 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns (1)-(3) shows the results for girls, and columns (4)-(6) shows the results for boys. SABLA districts include those initial districts where the program was rolled out in 2011. SABLA expanded districts include those districts where the program was expanded in 2017.

The initial implementation of the SABLA program introduced conditionality linked to out-of-school nutrition, which inadvertently led to increased dropout rates among adolescent girls. In response to these challenges, SABLA 2.0 was strategically redesigned. The expanded program, launched in 2017 across an additional 303 previously untreated districts, focused on reintegrating out-of-school girls back into formal education. While the nutrition benefits remained conditioned on girls being out of school, the program encouraged their return to education through increased home visits by *Anganwadi* workers and enhanced community involvement.¹⁴ Eventually, the program was expanded across the entire country in 2018.

We now evaluate the effect of the first expansion of SABLA in 2017 on the school dropout rates of adolescent girls aged 11-14. To do this, we append our dataset with the 2018 and 2022 waves of the ASER data.¹⁵ Table 6 examines the estimated Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect of the initial SABLA policy along with the expanded SABLA policy (SABLA 2.0) for adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range, using the specification in equation (3).

From Table 6, column (1), we see that the effect of the initial SABLA policy remains almost identical, with an increase in the school dropout rate for adolescent girls of 0.006 percentage points (p-value < 0.001), which translates to an approximately 9% rise in the school dropout rate. The results are robust to the addition of household-level and village-level covariates. Furthermore, columns (4) - (6) show no effect of the policy on the dropout rate of adolescent boys.

The expansion of the SABLA policy in 2017 did not significantly affect the dropout rates of adolescent girls. This conclusion remains robust after accounting for household-level demographic variables and village-level characteristics, as demonstrated in columns (2) and (3). Moreover, the expanded policy also showed no significant impact on the dropout rates of boys. These findings suggest that the initial increase in dropout rates may have been mitigated during this period due to a heightened focus on reintegrating out-of-school girls into the education system.

Our results suggest that modifications in the expanded scheme contributed to reducing unintended effects. Specifically, the expanded scheme emphasized transitioning out-of-school girls into the education system. This effort included deploying frontline workers, such as *Anganwadi* workers, to conduct home visits to out-of-school girls. During these visits, they counseled families

¹⁴The Government of India's Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) serves over 36 million 3-to-6-year-olds and 46 million children in the 0-3 age range, offering early childhood health, nutrition, and preschool education services delivered by *Anganwadi* workers at *Anganwadi* centers (Ganimian, Muralidharan, and Walters, 2024).

¹⁵Due to data limitations, we cannot identify the effect of the nationwide expansion of SABLA in 2018. Therefore, we only assess the impact of the 2017 expansion.

on the importance of education. Additionally, the expanded scheme incorporated various informational interventions, such as providing details on the procedures for re-entering school, motivating girls to return to school, and using female role models to inspire out-of-school girls.

Our findings align with the predictions of our model presented in Section 4. The informational interventions effectively increased households' perceived utility of schooling by highlighting the benefits of education through role models or frontline health workers. This underscores the potential of information as a valuable policy lever, particularly in contexts where unintended incentives may exist.

7.3 Health and Marriage Outcomes

Table 7: Health and Marriage Outcomes

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | Anemic | Moderate or Severe Anemia | Underweight | Low Height | Age at Marriage |
| 2011 SABLA Full Cohort × Treated Districts | -0.017** (0.007) | 0.000 (0.007) | -0.004 (0.006) | 0.004 (0.007) | -0.023 (0.048) |
| 2011 SABLA Older Cohort × Treated Districts | -0.005 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.006) | -0.007* (0.004) | 0.002 (0.006) | -0.058 (0.043) |
| Observations | 300,791 | 300,791 | 291,380 | 291,760 | 241,320 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.538 | 0.294 | 0.175 | 0.480 | 18.998 |

Notes: The sample consists of women surveyed during the fifth wave of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), conducted between 2019 and 2021, aged 11 to 25 when the SABLA policy was introduced in 2011. All regressions include a vector of exogenous controls, including the family wealth index, constructed as the first principal component from a principal component analysis of family assets, an indicator variable for rural residence, and an indicator variable for belonging to a Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), or Other Backward Caste (OBC). Additionally, all regressions include fixed effects for year of birth and district of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the DHS sampling cluster level.

We now evaluate the effect of the policy on health and marital outcomes using the fifth wave of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) conducted between 2019 and 2021, eight years after the initial implementation of SABLA in 2011. SABLA's nutritional support included a meal of 600 calories and 18-20 grams of protein, and iron and folic acid supplementation. Recall that the SABLA policy targeted adolescent girls in the 11-18 age range. In the previous sections, the ASER data allowed us to evaluate the effect of the policy in the 11-14 age range when out-of-school nutrition was provided. However, since NFHS-5 was conducted eight years after the initial implementation, we can only evaluate the effect for girls treated during the *entire* adolescent duration of 11-18, making it impossible to isolate the effect of the out-of-school nutrition program on health and marital outcomes.

We divide the treated cohorts into those fully treated by SABLA in the 11-14 and 15-18 age ranges (called the SABLA full cohort) and those treated only in the 15-18 age range (called the SABLA Older cohort). Table 7 shows health and marital outcomes results.

From Table 7, column (1), we find that the prevalence of anemia decreased by 1.7 percentage points (p -value < 0.05), translating to a decrease of approximately 3.2%. However, we find no effect on the prevalence of anemia for the cohorts treated only in the 15-18 age range. Column (2) of Table 7 shows that this decrease is driven by a reduction in mild or severe anemia, not moderate or severe.¹⁶ To compare the magnitude of our estimates, Calvi (2020) finds that the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) and its amendments, which established equal inheritance rights for sons and daughters, reduced severe anemia among women by 1 percentage point and moderate anemia by 3 percentage points. Lastly, Table 7, columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 shows that the policy had no substantial impact on the prevalence of below-average height or the prevalence of being underweight (defined as having a body mass index below 18.5).

It is well known that a daughter's schooling and marriage are joint decisions in an Indian household (Adams and Andrew, 2019). Given that the initial implementation of the policy affected the decision to continue schooling for adolescent girls in the 11-14 age range, we evaluate the impact of SABLA on age at marriage. From Table 7, column (5), in line with the finding of Chatterjee and Poddar (2024), we find no effect of the policy on age at marriage for both cohorts treated between the ages of 11-18 and those treated only during the older ages of 15-18.¹⁷

Finally, we compare our findings with those of Chatterjee and Poddar (2024) and discuss the similarities and differences in the analysis. Chatterjee and Poddar (2024) evaluates the effect of the SABLA policy on post-marital outcomes, focusing on the prevalence of domestic violence and women's intrahousehold bargaining power, using data from the fourth wave of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4) conducted in 2015-2016, four years after the initial implementation of SABLA in 2011. Consequently, their dataset includes a few adolescent girls treated by the policy in the 11-14 age range when SABLA included the out-of-school meal component. In contrast, the fifth wave of the NFHS (NFHS-5) includes more girls treated by SABLA during the 11-14 age range. Specifically, the NFHS-5 dataset contains data on 61,195 girls treated by SABLA during this period.

¹⁶The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) defines any anemia as Hemoglobin < 12.0 g/dL (non-pregnant) or < 11.0 g/dL (pregnant). Mild anemia as Hemoglobin 11.0-11.9 g/dL (non-pregnant) or 10.0-10.9 g/dL (pregnant). Moderate anemia as Hemoglobin 8.0-10.9 g/dL (non-pregnant) or 7.0-9.9 g/dL (pregnant). Severe anemia as Hemoglobin < 8.0 g/dL (non-pregnant) or < 7.0 g/dL (pregnant).

¹⁷We are unable to evaluate health outcomes for adolescent girls treated by the expanded SABLA (SABLA 2.0) due to the limited number of observations from this cohort.

As previously noted, unlike ASER, NFHS-4 or NFHS-5 cannot be used to study the impact of the policy on school dropout as you observe women *cumulatively* treated by SABLA in the 11-14 as well as the 15-18 age range, and as a result the adolescent girls who continue schooling beyond the age of 14 is a *selected* sample of girls, who have chosen not to dropout of school.

8 Conclusion

We evaluate the impact of two iterations of the Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls (SABLA) policy on the schooling and health outcomes of adolescent girls in India, with a particular focus on the component of providing out-of-school meals to girls in the 11-14 age range. Our findings indicate that the program's first iteration inadvertently increased the opportunity cost of schooling, resulting in higher dropout rates among adolescent girls in this age group. This underscores the critical role of in-school meals in promoting school attendance ([Adelman et al., 2008](#); [Afridi, 2011](#)). On a positive note, the policy did enhance health outcomes for adolescent girls, mainly by reducing the prevalence of anemia. The program's second iteration successfully addressed the issue of increased school dropouts, showing no adverse effect on the dropout rate of adolescent girls.

Our paper highlights an intriguing trade-off in policy implementation. The multi-dimensional and interconnected nature of social welfare implies that incentives designed to improve one aspect of welfare can either enhance or undermine other aspects. For instance, while the SABLA scheme aimed at better reintegration for out-of-school girls, it inadvertently altered the incentives for girls already in school. These findings underscore the necessity of careful policy design and implementation, illustrating how well-intentioned policies can sometimes yield unintended consequences ([Bharadwaj et al., 2020](#)). Additionally, our research demonstrates that information can serve as an effective policy lever to mitigate unintended spillover effects, as evidenced by the outcomes of the expanded scheme.

Future research should assess the long-term impacts of policy interventions targeting adolescent girls. While numerous studies have examined the long-term effects of early childhood interventions, policymakers are increasingly interested in targeting adolescents. This trend raises important questions about the efficacy and efficiency of such schemes, warranting further investigation.

References

- ADAMS, A. AND A. ANDREW (2019): “Preferences and beliefs in the marriage market for young brides,” Tech. rep., IFS Working Papers. [27]
- ADELMAN, S., D. GILLIGAN, AND K. LEHRER (2008): *How effective are food for education programs?: A critical assessment of the evidence from developing countries*, vol. 9, Intl Food Policy Res Inst. [3], [28]
- ADUKIA, A. (2017): “Sanitation and education,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9, 23–59. [5]
- AFRIDI, F. (2011): “The impact of school meals on school participation: evidence from rural India,” *Journal of Development Studies*, 47, 1636–1656. [3], [5], [28]
- AFRIDI, F., T. DINKELMAN, AND K. MAHAJAN (2018): “Why are fewer married women joining the work force in rural India? A decomposition analysis over two decades,” *Journal of Population Economics*, 31, 783–818. [24]
- ALDERMAN, H. AND D. BUNDY (2012): “School feeding programs and development: are we framing the question correctly?” *The World Bank Research Observer*, 27, 204–221. [1]
- ALDERMAN, H., D. O. GILLIGAN, AND K. LEHRER (2012): “The impact of food for education programs on school participation in northern Uganda,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 61, 187–218. [5], [19]
- ANDREW, A. AND A. ADAMS (2022): “Revealed beliefs and the marriage market return to education,” Tech. rep., Institute for Fiscal Studies. [3]
- ASHER, S., T. LUNT, R. MATSUURA, AND P. NOVOSAD (2021): “Development research at high geographic resolution: an analysis of night-lights, firms, and poverty in India using the shrug open data platform,” *The World Bank Economic Review*, 35, 845–871. [3], [22], [23]
- AURINO, E., A. GELLI, C. ADAMBA, I. OSEI-AKOTO, AND H. ALDERMAN (2023): “Food for Thought?: Experimental Evidence on the Learning Impacts of a Large-Scale School Feeding Program,” *Journal of Human Resources*, 58, 74–111. [5]
- AZAM, M. (2012): “Changes in wage structure in urban India, 1983–2004: A quantile regression decomposition,” *World Development*, 40, 1135–1150. [24]
- BANERJI, R., J. BERRY, AND M. SHOTLAND (2017): “The impact of maternal literacy and participation programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in India,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9, 303–337. [5]
- BARCELLOS, S. H., L. S. CARVALHO, AND A. LLERAS-MUNEY (2014): “Child gender and parental investments in India: Are boys and girls treated differently?” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 6, 157–189. [11]

- BERRY, J., S. MEHTA, P. MUKHERJEE, H. RUEBECK, AND G. K. SHASTRY (2020): “Implementation and effects of India’s national school-based iron supplementation program,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 144, 102428. [3]
- BHARADWAJ, P., L. K. LAKDAWALA, AND N. LI (2020): “Perverse consequences of well intentioned regulation: Evidence from India’s child labor ban,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 18, 1158–1195. [3], [28]
- BONNET, F., J. VANEK, M. CHEN, ET AL. (2019): “Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical brief,” *International Labour Office, Geneva*, 20. [24]
- BORKER, G. (2021): “Safety first: Perceived risk of street harassment and educational choices of women,” . [4]
- BORUSYAK, K., X. JARAVEL, AND J. SPIESS (2024): “Revisiting event-study designs: robust and efficient estimation,” *Review of Economic Studies*, rdae007. [2], [16], [17], [18], [34]
- BUCHMANN, N., E. FIELD, R. GLENNERSTER, S. NAZNEEN, AND X. Y. WANG (2023): “A signal to end child marriage: Theory and experimental evidence from Bangladesh,” *American Economic Review*, 113, 2645–2688. [4]
- CALLAWAY, B. AND P. H. SANT’ANNA (2021): “Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods,” *Journal of econometrics*, 225, 200–230. [15]
- CALVI, R. (2020): “Why are older women missing in India? The age profile of bargaining power and poverty,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 128, 2453–2501. [27]
- CALVI, R., A. BEAUCHAMP, AND S. FULFORD (2022): “Terms of Engagement: Migration, Dowry, and Love in Indian Marriages,” Tech. rep., CEPR Discussion Papers. [6]
- CALVI, R. AND A. KESKAR (2023): “Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1–45. [3]
- CHAKRABORTY, T. AND R. JAYARAMAN (2019): “School feeding and learning achievement: evidence from India’s midday meal program,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 139, 249–265. [1], [5], [10], [21]
- CHATTERJEE, S. AND P. PODDAR (2024): “Women’s empowerment and intimate partner violence: Evidence from a multidimensional policy in india,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 72, 801–832. [3], [6], [27]
- DAS, U. AND P. SARKHEL (2023): “Does more schooling imply improved learning? Evidence from the Kanyashree Prakalpa in India,” *Economics of Education Review*, 94, 102406. [4]
- DUFLO, E. (2001): “Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment,” *American economic review*, 91, 795–813. [15], [18]

- DUFLO, E., P. DUPAS, AND M. KREMER (2011): “Peer effects, teacher incentives, and the impact of tracking: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Kenya,” *American economic review*, 101, 1739–1774. [20]
- DUFLO, E., R. HANNA, AND S. P. RYAN (2012): “Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school,” *American economic review*, 102, 1241–1278. [5]
- EVANS, D., M. KREMER, AND M. NGATIA (2008): *The impact of distributing school uniforms on children’s education in Kenya*, World Bank Washington, DC. [5]
- FLETCHER, E., R. PANDE, AND C. M. T. MOORE (2017): “Women and work in India: Descriptive evidence and a review of potential policies,” . [24]
- GANIMIAN, A. J., K. MURALIDHARAN, AND C. R. WALTERS (2024): “Augmenting state capacity for child development: Experimental evidence from India,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 132, 000–000. [25]
- GELLI, A., U. MEIR, AND F. ESPEJO (2014): “School Feeding for Improving the Physical and Psychosocial Health of Disadvantaged Elementary School Children,” *Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews*. [21]
- GLEWWE, P. AND K. MURALIDHARAN (2016): “Improving education outcomes in developing countries: Evidence, knowledge gaps, and policy implications,” in *Handbook of the Economics of Education*, Elsevier, vol. 5, 653–743. [21]
- GOODMAN-BACON, A. (2021): “Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing,” *Journal of econometrics*, 225, 254–277. [15]
- HE, F. (2009): “Effect of WFP School Feeding Programme on School Enrollment: Evidence from Sri Lanka,” *International Journal of Educational Development*, 29, 205–212. [6], [20]
- HINRICHS, P. (2010): “The effects of the National School Lunch Program on education and health,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 29, 479–505. [5]
- IMBERMAN, S. A. AND A. D. KUGLER (2014): “The effect of providing breakfast in class on student performance,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 33, 669–699. [5]
- JAYARAMAN, R. AND D. SIMROTH (2015): “Impact of Midday Meal Programs on Educational Outcomes,” *Economic Education Review*, 48, 284–299. [19]
- JOMAA, L. H., E. MCDONNELL, AND C. PROBART (2011): “School Feeding Programs in Developing Countries: Impacts on Children’s Health and Educational Outcomes,” *Nutrition Reviews*, 69, 83–98. [21]
- KRÄMER, M., S. KUMAR, AND S. VOLLMER (2021): “Improving child health and cognition: Evidence from a school-based nutrition intervention in India,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 103, 818–834. [2]

- KREMER, M., N. CHAUDHURY, F. H. ROGERS, K. MURALIDHARAN, AND J. HAMMER (2005): “Teacher absence in India: A snapshot,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3, 658–667. [5]
- KREMER, M. AND E. MIGUEL (2004): “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities,” *Econometrica*, 72, 159–217. [20]
- LAVY, V. AND A. SCHLOSSER (2011): “Mechanisms and impacts of gender peer effects at school,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3, 1–33. [18]
- LEOS-URBEL, J., A. E. SCHWARTZ, M. WEINSTEIN, AND S. CORCORAN (2013): “Not just for poor kids: The impact of universal free school breakfast on meal participation and student outcomes,” *Economics of education review*, 36, 88–107. [5]
- MCEWAN, P. J. (2013): “The Impact of School Meals on School Enrollment: Evidence from Chile,” *Economics of Education Review*, 31, 613–627. [6], [20]
- MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT (2011): “RAJIV GANDHI SCHEME FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS(RGSEAG)— ‘SABLA’ - The scheme,” . [8]
- (2018): “Scheme for Adolescent Girls Administrative Guidelines 2018,” . [8]
- MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT (2013): “Evaluation of SABLA Scheme,” . [8]
- MURALIDHARAN, K. AND N. PRAKASH (2017): “Cycling to school: Increasing secondary school enrollment for girls in India,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9, 321–350. [4], [23]
- MURALIDHARAN, K., A. SINGH, AND A. J. GANIMIAN (2019): “Disrupting education? Experimental evidence on technology-aided instruction in India,” *American Economic Review*, 109, 1426–1460. [21]
- PENNINX, B. W., M. PAHOR, R. C. WOODMAN, AND J. M. GURALNIK (2006): “Anemia in old age is associated with increased mortality and hospitalization,” *The Journals of Gerontology Series A: Biological Sciences and Medical Sciences*, 61, 474–479. [2]
- RAMBACHAN, A. AND J. ROTH (2023): “A more credible approach to parallel trends,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 90, 2555–2591. [2], [16], [34]
- SCHULTZ, T. P. (2004): “School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa poverty program,” *Journal of development Economics*, 74, 199–250. [4]
- SINGH, A., A. PARK, AND S. DERCON (2014): “School meals as a safety net: an evaluation of the midday meal scheme in India,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 62, 275–306. [1]
- TODD, P. E. AND K. I. WOLPIN (2006): “Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program in Mexico: Using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child schooling and fertility,” *American economic review*, 96, 1384–1417. [2], [4], [9]


VERMEERSCH, C. AND M. KREMER (2005): *School meals, educational achievement, and school competition: evidence from a randomized evaluation*, vol. 3523, World Bank Publications. [3], [5], [21]

VON GRAFENSTEIN, L., A. KUMAR, S. KUMAR, AND S. VOLLMER (2021): “Impacts of double-fortified salt on anemia and cognition: four-year follow-up evidence from a school-based nutrition intervention in India,” . [2]

WOLPIN, K. I. (2013): *The limits of inference without theory*, MIT Press. [9]


A Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A1: Dropout Rates Girls Relative to Boys: Event Study



Note: The sample comprises children aged 14 and above who attended school at least until the age of 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). The analysis estimates the relative dropout rates of girls compared to boys using a triple difference-in-difference (DDD) specification. The treated cohorts include adolescent children fully treated by the SABLA program in the 11-14 age group, specifically those who were 11 years old or younger in 2011. Household-level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component based on the materials used to construct the respondent's house and whether the household has a television, phone, and electricity. Village-level covariates include the presence of a government school and a road. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

Figure A2: Dropout Rates: Event Study



Note: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Event Study plotted using the imputation approach in [Borusyak et al. \(2024\)](#). Deviations from parallel trends tested using [Rambachan and Roth \(2023\)](#). Parallel trend violations between two consecutive periods are constrained using a smoothness restriction, with $M = 0$ allowing only for linear violations of parallel trends and larger values of M allowing for larger deviations from linearity.

Table A1: Placebo Test (Pre-treatment Period)

| | (1) Dropped Out |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| Treat × Post × Girl Child | -0.000 (0.004) |
| Observations | 337,328 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Placebo-treated cohorts are children born after 1994. The placebo sample is restricted to children born before 1997.

Table A2: Placebo Test (Primary School Dropouts)

| | (1) Dropped Out |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Treat × Post × Girlchild | -0.001 (0.001) |
| Observations | 1,801,165 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The sample consists of all children above the age of 10, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). The placebo sample is restricted to children who dropped out before reaching 11 years of age.

Table A3: Learning Outcomes: Boys

| | (1) High Reading Level | (2) High Reading Level | (3) High Reading Level | (4) High Math Level | (5) High Math Level | (6) High Math Level |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| SABLA District × Treated Cohort | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.011** (0.004) | -0.009** (0.004) | -0.007 (0.005) |
| Household Covariates | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Village Covariates | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 344,240 | 310,004 | 290,097 | 343,438 | 309,327 | 289,488 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.806 | 0.809 | 0.807 | 0.631 | 0.633 | 0.632 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. A high reading level is defined as the ability to read a paragraph or a story. A high math level is defined as the ability to perform subtraction or division.

Table A4: Relative Learning Outcomes

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | High Reading Level | High Math Level | High Reading Level | High Math Level | High Reading Level | High Math Level |
| SABLA District × Treated Cohort × Girl Child | -0.002 (0.004) | 0.005 (0.005) | -0.004 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.005) | -0.005 (0.005) | 0.001 (0.005) |
| Household Covariates | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Village Covariates | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 662,318 | 660,727 | 594,872 | 593,537 | 557,336 | 556,145 |
| Mean of Dep. Variable | 0.804 | 0.598 | 0.806 | 0.600 | 0.805 | 0.598 |

Notes: The sample consists of children above the age of 14 who were in school at least until age 11, drawn from the 2009 to 2016 waves of the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). Household level covariates include the mother's age, the father's age, an indicator variable for whether the mother attended school, an indicator variable for whether the father attended school, and the family's wealth index, calculated as the first principal component using the material the respondent's house is constructed and whether the household has television, phone, and electricity. Village level covariates include the presence of government school and road. All regressions include the child's birth year and district-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. A high reading level is defined as the ability to read a paragraph or a story. A high math level is defined as the ability to perform subtraction or division.

Table A5: Program Components by Age Group and School Enrollment Status

| Age Group | 11-14 | | 15-18 | |
|--|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| | Out of school girls | In-school girls | Out of school girls | In-school girls |
| Take home ration or hot cooked meal (at least 600 calories and 18 gms protein) | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Iron Folic Acid Supplements | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Vocational Training | | | ✓ | |
| Nutrition and Health Education | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Health Check-up | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Counseling on family welfare, reproductive and sexual health, and child care practices | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Life Skill Education | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |


Table A6: Consumption Pattern of Take Home Rations

| Consumption Pattern of Take Home Rations | Percent |
|--|---------|
| Shared with Family | 57.30% |
| Consumed by the beneficiary | 42.40% |
| Shared with Friends & Others | 0.30% |

Data Source: Ministry of Women and Child Development, ASCI Survey, 2013

Figure A3: SABLA Districts

**List of Districts selected under
Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of
Adolescent Girls (RGSEAG) SABLA**



Data Source: Ministry of Women and Child Development